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suffer from its failure to see its own safeguard in a moral hierarchy, and so deprive human nature of one of its chief instruments, the human garden will be in a bad way indeed. What the description of that hierarchy should be, and by what discipline it should be restored, are, of course, eternal questions. But that those questions are a challenge to the intellect, on the one hand, and on the other that the intellect as science uses it is not in a way to answer them, are perturbing considerations to those who, from outside, have watched the philosophical movements of the last two decades with a jealous concern for a proportionate conception of life.

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF VALUES

RECENTLY there have appeared in this JOURNAL several articles in discussion of the questions: What is the nature of values and of valuation? and, What objects are valued? These questions have been dealt with in fresh and concrete fashion, far removed from the complex and formal dogmatism of the German schools of value-philosophy. The latest contributions to the discussion come from Professors Bush¹ and Dewey.² It is because the writer believes that these articles did not reach a common ground, that he ventures to attempt to make a few rough places plain, and to sketch the outline of a theory (developed more fully elsewhere³) of the psychological basis of values, which is designed to clear away many misunderstandings.

I

I purpose first to state several differences of opinion among the views of Professors Bush, Dewey, and Urban.⁴

1. What values are fundamental? Professor Urban answers: "It need scarcely be said that an ultimate definition of value is concerned only with intrinsic value, all extrinsic or instrumental values going back ultimately to concepts of intrinsic value." Professor Dewey does not explicitly refuse the name "value" to intrinsic, immediate goods, but uses it for himself almost entirely in reference to instrumental values. He does this, because he wishes to emphasize

¹ "Value and Causality," this JOURNAL, Vol. XV., No. 4, 1918.

² "The Objects of Valuation," *ibid.*, Vol. XV., No. 10, 1918.

³ "Values, Immediate and Contributory, and Their Interrelation," N. Y. Univ. Press, 1919 (in press).

⁴ "Value and Existence," this JOURNAL, Vol. XIII., No. 17, 1916.

the indeterminate character of many intrinsic goods. To call immediate goods "values" seems to him to grant that these values are "completely there for knowledge, provided only we could get at them." Professor Bush recognizes two classes of values, the one, immediate, intrinsic, and independent, to be contrasted with the other, mediate, instrumental, and dependent.

2. Under what conditions does intrinsic valuation take place? Professor Bush believes that "independent values are, so to speak, the premises of specific value syllogisms. The can not be criticized while they remain premises . . ." Professor Dewey believes that "there are situations wherein the adequate data for settling a determinate like and dislike *can not* be had until after an act which issues from a preliminary estimate or valuation as to what the good *will be*." Professor Bush believes that intrinsic values apply to the present; Professor Dewey thinks that they are often ends to be arrived at through future experience.

3. Special theses of these writers are:

Bush: Value is to be distinguished from causality by the presence in the former of the bias or interest of a living creature.

Dewey: Immediate goods are not all *given* "in the sense of being completely there for knowledge provided only we could get at them." We may make mistakes in "settling" likes and dislikes if we try to determine them apart from the consequences of the specific situations in which they arise.

To one who compares the articles of Professors Bush and Dewey, it would seem that their authors are less concerned with finding a broad and fundamental standpoint and with reconciling differences of opinion, than with establishing individual propositions. Professor Bush's article gives the more comprehensive viewpoint. He states the condition of the existence of value, namely, the presence of bias or interest of a living organism. He then distinguishes two separate classes of values, immediate and instrumental, and gives characteristics of each class which serve to contrast it with the other. Thus, immediate values are "independent," related to the present, given as good or bad, friendly to beauty and esthetics. Instrumental values, on the other hand, are dependent, related to the future, judged and criticized, friendly to usefulness and ethics. It is not evident from his article whether Professor Dewey is willing to recognize a class of immediate values that are related to the present and given as good or bad irrespective of judgment. He does say, however, that *some* intrinsic goods can be established as goods only at some future time, the implication being that these intrinsic values are not independent of the future. He also makes these values de-

pendent, not only upon the future, but also upon a provisional judgment which leads to an act whose consequences determine these intrinsic goods. These goods are "brought into existence" only when by actual experiment I determine the value of the consequences of my action. My attitude of liking or disliking the consequences of an action can not always be determined before the action has taken place. Apparently Professor Dewey would not care to recognize sudden or temperamental likings and dislikings as intrinsic values. He seems to feel that to be dignified by the name "value" they must prove their worth in the experience of the individual.

From the last observation, it would appear that Professors Bush and Dewey use the word "value" in different meanings. Professor Dewey would associate it only with goods that are *judged* as means or ends. Professor Bush would apply it also to cases of liking and disliking where no judgment is made as to whether the value is justified. I believe that the use of "value" to describe my relation to objects that I like, dislike, desire, want, wish, etc., is sufficiently widespread to give good reason for its retention in this broader sense. I shall therefore speak of my most idle fancy for an object, independently of whether it is worthy or unworthy in reference to a standard, or of whether I shall retain it after further consideration of experience with it, as of *immediate* value.

With Professor Dewey, however, I shall distinguish between the *functional* aspect of instrumentalism in the judgment, and the aspect of instrumental character of the *content* of the same judgment. When it is said that the judgment "I must go to see my physician" is functionally instrumental, it is meant that the very *act* of judging is instrumental in causing me to pay the visit. This is quite distinct from the usefulness or uselessness of my visit itself in effecting my cure.

II

After this preliminary discussion, I may proceed to sketch certain relevant aspects of a detailed theory of values. Previous attempts to formulate a theory of values in an empirical way have plunged *in medias res* with little regard for any fundamental principles underlying this research. The time is ripe for a thorough discussion of the more elementary principles of a value philosophy. Such work has been confined hitherto to the German schools of value philosophy and their American representatives. Rickert and Windelband are notable examples of those who have erected a value philosophy on the basis of transcendentalism. No thoroughgoing analysis of values and valuation from a strictly empirical standpoint has yet appeared. In this brief paper it would not be possible to give an exposition of

such a philosophy. I shall confine myself to a few observations that may clear away some differences of opinion expressed in the two articles under discussion.

My remarks will concern two topics: I. The psychological basis of values. II. The relation of values to knowledge.

I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF VALUES

Professor Bush has well distinguished a causal from a value situation by saying that the latter requires the presence of the bias or interest of a living creature. Metaphysically, perhaps, it might be maintained that a universe of minerals and plants contains intrinsic values—objects that are good or bad in themselves without reference to any living creature. From the empirical point of view, however, such a proposition appears highly absurd. We find things good or bad; we admire or despise them; we may think of them as to-be-liked or to-be-disliked; but the reference to a living interest is always apparent. If, in certain cases, we tend to hypostasize the attractiveness, give it an “over-personal” reference, and say that norms of beauty and morality exist in and for themselves as well as for us, we pass from an empirical to a metaphysical standpoint. The only empirical evidence in favor of such a theory would be a consensus of opinion among human individuals. But the great majority of our likes and dislikes can not so be universalized. All immediate values, on the other hand, are found empirically to be related to a human interest. It is therefore incumbent upon the empiricist to deal with these values from the standpoint of interest, and to reserve the cases of disputed values for separate discussion.

So in the case of instrumental or contributory values, it is quite superfluous to say that, since the rain is contributory to the growth of crops, rain is of contributory value apart from all human interest. Such a statement is superfluous because the word “causality” sufficiently expresses the mentioned relation between rain and crops. It is least confusing to keep the word “value” for situations where human interest, or the interest of some other living creature, is involved. By such a procedure we shall steer clear of many a metaphysical subtlety and find it more possible to formulate a theory of values which shall be wholly empirical.

If we recognize the distinction of Professor Bush between value and causality, we shall, nevertheless, find it undesirable to employ one of the adjectives which he uses to designate immediate values. The word “independent” is too indefinite to be satisfactory. By his own distinction, *all* values are *dependent* upon “the ego-centric situation.” We shall, therefore, confine our designation of this class of values to the words “immediate” and “intrinsic.”

For the purpose of a fundamental separation of two classes of values, the time-distinction of Professor Bush is somewhat confusing. He holds that immediate values relate to the present, contributory values, to the future. Professor Dewey criticizes this distinction on the ground that many immediate values also have to await the future before becoming "settled." That is, I may not be able really to tell whether I like or dislike an object or action until I learn the consequences that it will carry with it. It may be remarked that Professor Dewey apparently uses the term "immediate value" in the sense of "known immediate value" and "permanent immediate value." This is a narrower application of the term than that employed by Professor Bush, who would, I think, admit into the category of values momentary likings and dislikings. Professor Dewey inclines to a eulogistic use of the term "value." He seems to feel that "value" connotes stability. I think that Professor Bush would interpret Professor Dewey's example as one in which an entirely new immediate value had arisen. He would say that the citizen who revised his former sentiment as to the immediate value of the children's parade in Syracuse, by coming to believe that it was productive of more harm than good, did not by so doing "settle" an immediate value, but gained a new one. He might even reconsider the matter, come to believe that after all the parade was on the whole a good thing, and feel a liking for it. He would then experience a third immediate value in relation to the same object of consideration.

I believe, however, that the difference of opinion on this point between Professors Bush and Dewey is chiefly one of standpoint. Any time distinction between values may be regarded from either of two angles. Professor Bush thinks of valuing from the standpoint of the individual who values. Every act of valuing, at the moment of occurrence, is a present act, but there is a distinction between immediate and contributory values by which the former, given as good or bad, find their whole meaning in the present of the valuing individual, whereas the latter are referred by the individual to some future act. Professor Dewey regards valuing from the standpoint of an observer. He considers a value instrumental only when it becomes justified as such in the course of experience. He applies the same thought to immediate valuation. In view of the confusion arising from this diversity of standpoints, it seems to me to be wiser not to press the time distinction as an elementary difference between immediate and contributory values.

Thus far I have tried only to clear the ground of metaphysical assumptions and undesirable distinctions. Now that two distinct

classes of values have been differentiated, we may inquire where we are to go to obtain the elements of an empirical account of values. Where if not chiefly to psychology? We have seen that values and valuation are never apart from the bias or interest of a living creature. We shall not discover the nature of values by exclusive consideration of objects and their effects, or acts and their consequences, but by consideration of the relation of living creatures to objects and acts which are valued. Furthermore, in an empirical account, we must not fall into the snare pointed out by Professor Dewey of assuming that values are somehow all *given* to conscious activity in advance, for then we should be led into transcendental speculations which are wholly metaphysical in character. We must rather regard them for what they are in experience, namely, relations of living creatures to objects and acts.

It might be urged that instead of a psychological account we should undertake a classification of various types of value relations. It is easy, for instance, with the use of the nomenclature of modern objective idealism and of neo-rationalism, to describe contributory values as triadic, immediate values as dyadic, relations. But while this is a useful task in later study, it fails to mark that which will distinguish triadic and dyadic relations of value from other triadic and dyadic relations. Moreover, it takes no account of the different manner in which the term "living creature" enters into relations of the two classes of values. An object or act remains the same, however it be valued; if there be a fundamental difference, it must occur in the term "conscious activity." And when we seek the determining factor in some difference of relation to conscious activity, we are led to psychology.

Of late years the tendency among psychologists has been strong in the direction of treating conscious activity as unitary, rather than as split up into a number of "faculties." There is current a morbid fear of using language that suggests the notion of a "consciousness" which is a container, holding three quarts of faculties. We must avoid this pitfall, but we need not go to the other extreme of denying that there are different aspects of conscious activity, each of which, while never present without the others, is yet distinct in character. Cognition and feeling are examples of such aspects of conscious activity. There is never the faintest feeling from which cognition is wholly absent, nor is there ever a "pure" thought which is unattended by a fringe of feeling. And yet feeling is not thought; the two are quite distinct functions of conscious activity.

Now I believe that the psychological basis of immediate values is

to be found in the aspect of feeling, and that of contributory values, in the aspect of cognition. This assignment follows from empirical observation. For what words do we employ when we speak of an immediate value? Do we not use "like," "dislike," "desire," "wish," "demand," "want," "love," "hate," etc.? These words all have an emotional connotation, predominant over the cognitive and will aspects of consciousness. On the other hand, when we speak of an instrumental value, we declare that an object or act is "good for something." The pen is good for writing; apples are good for food. In thus relating objects or acts to other objects or acts, the feeling aspect is at a minimum; the mental operation is chiefly cognitive, descriptive rather than appreciative. I may consume a custard in the belief that it is good for nourishing my body, at the same time that I heartily dislike or am quite indifferent to its flavor.

Empirically, therefore, it is possible to establish the feeling aspect of conscious activity as a term in immediate value relations, and the cognitive aspect, as a term in contributory values. A thorough study of values on this psychological basis and in connection with biological facts is productive of a theory of the interrelations of values which is wholly empirical in its nature. In this paper, I can but hint of its application to knowledge, a portion of the discussion which has proved especially difficult of reconciliation in the articles of Professors Bush and Dewey.

II. THE RELATION OF VALUES TO KNOWLEDGE

Both Professor Bush and Professor Dewey assume that immediate as well as contributory values have to do with judgment. The former regards immediate values as "the premises of specific value syllogisms;" the latter disputes this assertion, and speaks of "settling a determinate like and dislike." Both of these writers apparently believe that in order to value immediately one must *know* that he values immediately. I believe that it is because of such an assumption that many of the tangles of value philosophy have arisen. I shall endeavor to show that it is not necessary to judge when we value in either an immediate or a contributory fashion.

First we may take the case of contributory values. Suppose that a man, while plowing a field for cultivation, meets with a great stone which he can not lift or remove. Looking about, he sees a dead branch, takes it in his hands, places one end under the stone, and with the branch as a lever rolls it to one side of the field. It is quite valid to say that the branch and the force exerted by the man were the chief cause of the moving of the stone. But, as Professor Bush points out, when the interest of a living creature enters into a causal

situation, we distinguish the situation from one where causality alone is present by calling it a value-situation. We therefore say, more properly, that the branch was valuable to the man for the purpose of moving the stone, and we speak of the branch as of contributory value to him. In this case, however, the man did not necessarily make some such judgment as, "I can move the stone with this branch." His action was the outcome of a cognitive progress, but cognition did not necessarily reach to judgment before he performed the act. He may have experimented in hit-or-miss fashion in many ways before he found a useful means. *After* the act, he may have made a judgment based on his past experience, such as, "A branch is a good thing for moving a stone." That he may at some past time have made a similar judgment, and that he *might* have been led to the action after making such a judgment, are quite irrelevant to the fact that he actually did make use of the branch without judging. In the hypothetical instance, he has verified a contributory *value*, but not a *judgment* of contributory value. Granted that he used perception, some memory, discrimination, and other elementary cognitive processes, he yet did not *judge*. But inasmuch as the act itself was the employment of a means to an end that interested a living being, we must not refuse the title "value" to it, but we must say that the branch was of contributory value to him in the act itself, even though he made no judgment of what he was going to do. Whether the cognitive process flowered into a judgment before the act is immaterial to the presence of the contributory value.

It is thus evident that contributory values, demanding only the presence of a living interest in a means to an end—which may be satisfied with much less than judgment—do not require a judgment to bring them into existence. They do require elements of cognition, for cognition is their psychological basis, and interest in a means to an end can not exist without it. In the great majority of cases where we use objects or acts for some end, the logical status of the situation is not formulated consciously in judgment. I sit down to write a letter, but do not first say to myself, "My pen is good for writing; the paper is good to write upon." I would be more likely to make such judgments if I were questioned about my use of pen and paper, or if I found some difficulty in using these media. And since the term "value" is not to be restricted to the conscious activity of human beings, but is to be used of all living creatures where interest is possible, we may say truly that twigs are of contributory value to birds in building their nests—assuming, of course, that animals are not unconscious automata, but that they are possessed of rudimentary cognitive processes.

Immediate values also are not dependent for their presence upon judgment. I have argued that their psychological basis is to be found in the feeling or affective side of conscious activity. The relation which constitutes an immediate value, therefore, is a relation between an object or act and the feeling side of conscious activity. So far as immediate value is concerned, any elements of cognition in conscious activity are to be left out of account entirely. I like the taste of peaches. By my very feeling of liking, the peaches become of immediate value to me. Smoking and playing tennis are acts which I enjoy. They are therefore of immediate value to me. It is not necessary for me to formulate any judgment such as, "I like peaches" in order for me to enjoy their taste. Just in so far as there is present the feeling of liking, there is also present the immediate value.

This simple way of distinguishing between immediate and contributory values makes it possible to avoid many false complications. One of the chief sources of confusion in value philosophy has arisen from the fact that it is possible to make judgments of immediate values. It is supposed by some writers that, because I can talk about my likes and dislikes, the judgments that I may make about them have to do with the actual values themselves. This I emphatically deny. To make the matter clear, I may choose an example. An individual says, "I like peaches." We must separate carefully several elements of the situation where this judgment is made. First, there is the act itself of judging. This element, which, as I understand him, is what Professor Dewey would call the "functional" aspect of judgment, is to be considered and interpreted, in terms of value, in connection with judging in general. I hold to the view of Professor Dewey that all the cognitive processes are functionally instrumental in character. Thus the *act* itself of judging will be of contributory value to the individual. Secondly, there is to be considered the *content* of the judgment. This content may itself be of contributory value. Just to what degree this will be true will depend upon its future usefulness. Perhaps the individual spoke the words in a company. The result may be that when he again visits these friends they will give him peaches for desert. Thirdly, we must take account of the fact that the individual expressed in judgment a fact of immediate value. This will mean no more than that between the peaches and the affective side of his conscious activity there is a relation of immediate value. Provided the liking was there, the fact of immediate value would also be there, regardless of whether he made a judgment concerning it.

III

From the above discussion of the elementary nature of values, it may be seen that the adoption of such a psychological basis of values opens up a broad field of investigation. First, there is the problem of the origin of values. When does an individual begin to value? Or, in other words, when can we say that more is present than causality in the relation of a living organism to its environment? These questions demand biological, as well as psychological treatment.

Again, another important branch of the subject has to do with the interrelation of values in respect to knowledge. Here, distinguishing between standpoints of the individual and of an observer, we must determine what values are related to each standpoint, and how the individual himself may, in the course of evolution, come to observe by making his own judgments. Interesting questions also arise as to the values of true and false judgments. It is susceptible of proof that some false judgments are of contributory value.

Another fertile field of investigation has to do with the interrelation of immediate and contributory values in the experience of a mature individual. Since conscious activity is always both cognitive and affective, objects and acts are valued at the same time in both an immediate and a contributory way. Due to this fact are many interrelations of coexistent values. This topic also demands biological treatment, and a consideration of the relation of man to his environment in terms of value.

Finally, when an empirical theory of values has been developed, it is desirable to make a careful analysis of the transcendental speculations of Rickert, Windelband, Münsterberg, and others, in order to determine just where their views diverge from an empirical account of values.

In consideration of the foregoing programme and from his own meditation on these subjects, the writer believes that the study of values, far from having been completed in the existing literature, is yet in its youth.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Rousseau and Romanticism. IRVING BABBITT. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co. 1919. Pp. xxiii + 426.

There was once upon a time a classic art, inspired by men of the type of Aristotle, or even better Buddha, and one may add Christ. This art was "highly imaginative;" only this imagination was kept